Chapter III

The Current Situation

n contrast to its campaign of outright killing, imprisonment, and torture of Bahá’ís during the 1980s, the Iranian government has in recent years focused largely on economic and social efforts to drive Bahá’ís from Iran and destroy their cultural and community life.

Such measures include ongoing efforts to prevent Bahá’ís from receiving higher education, to deny them the means of economic livelihood, and to deprive them of the inspiration provided by their sacred and historic sites.

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Interior of the house of Mirza Abbas Nuri, an architectural landmark in Tehran, during its demolition in June 2004. High Resolution Image >

The government has also used arbitrary arrests and detentions, coupled with the confiscation of personal property, to terrorize, oppress and otherwise keep the community off balance — a stratagem that appears to be on the rise. Behind these techniques remains the implicit threat of long term imprisonment and execution.

Above all else, the Bahá’í community remains without fundamental religious freedoms accorded to it in international human rights documents that Iran has signed. These include the right of Bahá’ís to freely assemble, to choose their leadership, and to openly manifest their religion “in worship, observance, practice and teaching.”

Denial of Access to Education

The government’s efforts to deny Bahá’í youth access to higher education perhaps most clearly demonstrate the lengths to which the Iranian government is willing to go in its campaign of cultural cleansing.

As previously stated, the Iranian government banned Bahá’í youth from education shortly after the 1979 Islamic revolution. At first, all Bahá’í children were excluded from schooling, but in the 1990s, primary and secondary school children were allowed to re-enroll.

But the ban on the entry of Bahá’í youth into public and private institutions of higher education has remained. The Bahá’í Faith places a high value on education, and Bahá’ís have always been among the best-educated groups in Iran. Being denied access to higher education for years has had a demoralizing effect on Bahá’í youth, and the erosion of the educational level of the community is clearly aimed at hastening its impoverishment.

In late 2003, early 2004, however, the government indicated that it would allow Bahá’í youth to enroll in university in the autumn of 2004. (It’s worth noting that the government was at the time engaged in a human rights dialogue with the European Union, and one demand of the Europeans was improved access to education for Bahá’ís.)

The key to this change was the publication of news articles stating that the question of religious affiliation would be removed from university entrance examinations and other university enrollment documents.

The removal of the data field asking for religious affiliation was critical to Bahá’í youth who sought to enter university. The government had always said that if Bahá’ís simply declare themselves as Muslims, they would be allowed to enroll. But for Bahá’ís, such a false declaration would not only be against the principles of their faith, which precludes lying or dissimulation, it would also tacitly play into the hands of government efforts to get them to deny their faith.

False Promises

With the promise that religious affiliation would not matter, about 1,000 Bahá’ís accordingly signed up for and took university entrance examinations. And, indeed, no field declaring religion was on the papers.

Students were asked to take a religious subject examination, however. It came as part of the whole range of subject tests relating to mathematics, language, history, and so on. The religion tests were offered in four subjects, Islam, Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism, corresponding to the four recognized religions in Iran.

Most Bahá’í students opted for the Islamic subject test since, as the majority religion, Islam is taught in all schools and most Bahá’ís in Iran accordingly have a solid familiarity with its teachings.

In August, however, when the examination results were mailed out, government authorities had printed the word “Islam” in a data field listing a prospective student’s religion. Officials cynically explained they did that on the assumption that choosing to take the subject test on Islam amounts to a de facto declaration of faith in Islam.

Upon learning of the forced religious declaration, a group of Bahá’í students complained to officials at the Educational Measurement and Evaluation Organization (EMEO), asking if they could return the exam results with corrected information. A footnote in the letter conveying examination results said that incorrect names and addresses could and should be corrected and returned.

However, no mention was made about correcting religious information. Indeed, Bahá’ís were told by EMEO officials that “incorrect religion would not be corrected” on the forms since the Bahá’í Faith is not among the officially recognized religions in Iran.

Shortly after that meeting, Bahá’í students wrote a letter of protest to the EMEO. The students expressed, clearly, their objection to having been designated as Muslims after having been promised that they would not have to disclose their religion in order to take the entrance examination.

At first, officials of the EMEO seemed to sympathize with their problem, even allowing Bahá’ís to fill out revised registration forms with no religious affiliation. However, even though some 800 Bahá’í students who had passed their examinations also met the new deadline for submission of the revised forms, only ten names were published in an EMEO bulletin on 12 September 2004 announcing which students had been admitted to university.

It’s worth noting also that many Bahá’ís received high scores on the examinations, and, in fact, many of them were passed over in the admission process, while many lower-scoring Muslim students were accepted.

In the end, out of solidarity with the rest of the 800 students who had been unfairly discriminated against, those ten Bahá’ís declined to register in the universities to which they had been accepted. And so, for the school year 2004-2005, Bahá’í young people were once again utterly deprived of access to higher education.

For Bahá’ís, the entire episode seems calculated to accomplish a number of government objectives. First, it apparently seeks to demoralize Iranian Bahá’í youth in an effort to induce them to leave the country. Second, it allowed Iranian authorities to identify by name those Bahá’ís with outstanding academic ability, who might at some point play a role in helping to revive the Bahá’í community’s fortunes. And, third, it allowed the Iranian government to say to international human rights monitors that they had given the Bahá’ís a chance to enroll — and that it was the Bahá’ís themselves who refused the opportunity.

Yet the government, of course, has long been aware that Bahá’ís cannot and will not as a matter of religious principle falsify or misrepresent their beliefs. And so it is clear from the whole affair that the 1991 policy aiming at blocking the development and progress of the Bahá’í community remains in effect.

Destruction of Holy Places

In the destruction of Bahá’í holy places, the government also demonstrates the lengths to which it will go to suffocate the Bahá’í community in Iran and to cleanse Bahá’í culture from modern memory — even though it may mean destroying monuments and buildings of historic importance to the society at large.

In June 2004, authorities demolished an historic house in Tehran that had been designed and owned by the father of the Faith’s founder. The house was not only significant to Bahá’ís but was also considered to be a sterling example of period architecture of historic importance to Iranians.

Destruction of cultural heritage. Another image of the interior of the house of Mirza Abbas Nuri in Tehran during its demolition in June 2004. High Resolution Image >

The house that was destroyed in June was owned by Mirza Abbas Nuri, the father of Bahá’u’lláh. Its destruction prompted an outcry by Bahá’ís around the world.

In six nations, Bahá’í communities coordinated the publication of a statement in major newspapers that decried the house’s destruction as part of a campaign of “cultural cleansing” against the minority Bahá’í community in Iran.

Noting that the house was an “historical monument, a precious example of Islamic-Iranian architecture, ‘a matchless model of art, spirituality, and architecture,’” the statement compared this action by Iran’s extremist Muslim leadership to those of the Taliban of Afghanistan.

“The hatred of the extremist mullahs for the Bahá’ís is such that they, like the Taliban of Afghanistan who destroyed the towering Buddhist sculptures at Bamian, intend not only to eradicate the religion, but even to erase all traces of its existence in the country of its birth,” said the statement.

“In their determination to rid Iran of the Bahá’í community and obliterate its very memory, the fundamentalists in power are prepared even to destroy the cultural heritage of their own country, which they appear not to realize they hold in trust for humankind,” the statement continued.

Mirza Abbas Nuri himself was widely regarded as one of Iran’s greatest calligraphers and statesmen. In July, the Iranian newspaper Hamshahripublished a lengthy article about his life and the architecture of his house.

“As he had good taste for the arts and for beauty, he designed his own house in such a style that it became known as one of the most beautiful houses of that period,” wrote Iman Mihdizadih on 13 July 2004. “The plasterwork and the tile-work in the rooms as well as the verdant veranda, the courtyard with its central pool, and the trees planted in the flowerbeds, all created a tranquil atmosphere in this house.”

The house was destroyed over the period of about one week in June. The demolition order was issued in April by Ayatollah Kani, director of the Marvi School and the Endowments Office of the government, ostensibly for the purpose of creating an Islamic cemetery. When the demolition started on 20 June, officials from the Ministry of Information were present, and by 29 June more than 70 percent of the structure had been destroyed.

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Gravesite of Quddus, an historic figure of the Bahá’í Faith, during its surreptitious demolition in April 2004. The gravesite is located in Babol, Iran. High Resolution Image >

The destruction of the house of Mirza Abbas Nuri followed the razing in April 2004 of another historic Bahá’í property, the gravesite of Quddus, an early disciple of the Bahá’í Faith. The action came after demolition work started in February and then halted temporarily in the face of protest at the local, national, and international levels.

Indeed, Bahá’ís had approached national authorities after the demolition work had been started, and for a time that work was halted. Then, in April, it was discovered that the dismantling of the gravesite had continued surreptitiously over a period of days until the structure was entirely demolished.

The house-like structure marked the resting place of Mullah Muhammad-Ali Barfurushi, known as Quddus (The Most Holy). Quddus was the foremost disciple of the Báb, the Prophet-Herald of the Bahá’í Faith.

The destruction of two such important holy sites in 2004 was not without precedent. In March 1979, the House of the Báb, the holiest Bahá’í shrine in Iran, was turned over by the government to a Muslim cleric known for his anti-Bahá’í activities. In September that year, that house was destroyed by a mob led by mullahs and officials of the Department of Religious Affairs.

Likewise, in the early years of the Islamic Republic, the House of Bahá’u’lláh in Takur, where the Founder of the Bahá’í Faith spent His childhood, met a similar fate: it was demolished and the site was offered for sale to the public.

Bahá’ís gather outside Tehran in 1982 for the funeral of one of their co-religionists who was killed by the government. High Resolution Image >

Over the years, as well, in Tehran and other cities throughout Iran, Bahá’í buildings have been looted and burned, Bahá’í cemeteries have been bulldozed and Bahá’í graves have been broken open. In the Tehran area, the Bahá’ís were forced to bury their dead in a barren stretch of land reserved by the authorities for “infidels.” Having access to their own cemeteries is especially important to Bahá’ís because, as might be expected, they are not allowed to bury their dead in Muslim cemeteries.

Arbitrary Arrests and Harassment

Beyond such specific efforts at cultural cleansing, the government has in recent years continued its policy of keeping the Bahá’í community off balance through various measures, including arbitrary arrests, short term detention, persistent harassment, and other forms of intimidation and discrimination.

As noted, hundreds of Bahá’ís were imprisoned during the early 1980s. Then, in response to international pressure, the government gradually released nearly all long-term Bahá’í prisoners. As of July 2005, for example, only two Bahá’ís, Dhabihu’llah Mahrami and Mehran Kawsari, were being held under long-term prison sentences.

Yet the use of arbitrary arrest and short-term imprisonment as methods of harassment, terror and oppression against Bahá’ís not only continues but appears to be on the rise. In late July-early August 2005, as this publication was going to press, some 16 Bahá’ís in three locations were arrested and imprisoned.

In March, April, and May of 2005 some 35 Bahá’ís across Iran were arrested and held for short periods, ranging from a week to nearly three months. Those arrested included not only prominent members of the community in Tehran, but also six Bahá’ís in Shiraz, nine in the city of Semnan, and nine Bahá’í farmers whose homes and land had previously been confiscated in the village of Kata.

Most were arbitrarily detained without any charge being filed against them. Some of the prisoners were held incommunicado, in unknown locations, while their families desperately searched for them. Most were released only after having posted significant amounts of money, property deeds or business licenses as bail.

Moreover, government agents conducted prolonged searches of many of the homes of those who were arrested, confiscating documents, books, computers, copiers and other belongings.

Among those arrested in the spring of 2005, only Mr. Kawsari remains in prison at the time this booklet was published in August 2005. Mr. Kawsari was arrested on 8 March 2005 for distributing the open letter sent to President Khatami [see page 30]. He received a one-year sentence and has been incarcerated in Evin prison.

Also recently in the city of Yazd, long a center of anti-Bahá’í activities, it appears that the police chief orchestrated a series of incidents against Bahá’ís. In late 2004 and early 2005, a number of Bahá’ís were arrested, detained, and interrogated; several were beaten in their homes; at least one Bahá’í-owned business was set afire; and the Bahá’í graveyard was desecrated.

Such incidents are hardly isolated. In 2003, for example, some 23 Bahá’ís in 18 different localities in Iran were subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention for short periods of time. In all cases, Iranian authorities summoned these people because they were Bahá’ís, questioned them about their beliefs, and then released them.

In 2002, 17 Bahá’í youth who were participating in a camp were arrested and detained for questioning. Reports about this incident in the Iranian press carried a negative slant, referring to the young Bahá’ís in a derogatory and vulgar manner.

Discrimination in the courts

The story of Mr. Mahrami, also in prison at the time of the publication of this booklet, is instructive in that it likewise reflects the very real and continuing threat of imprisonment for the Bahá’ís in Iran — and the degree to which the legal system is prejudiced against Bahá’ís. Mr. Mahrami was first called before the Islamic Revolutionary Court in Yazd in 1995 and questioned about his adherence to the Bahá’í Faith. Several meetings were held in an effort to persuade him to renounce his beliefs; he refused and was charged with apostasy. In 1996 he was sentenced to death. Since his heirs are not Muslims but Bahá’ís, his properties and assets were confiscated. After his lawyer had appealed to the Supreme Court, Iranian officials announced that the Court had rejected the verdict of the Revolutionary Court and referred the case to a civil court. However, in 1997, the Supreme Court confirmed the death sentence (communicated orally to his relatives). Finally, in 1999, the Bahá’í International Community was unofficially informed that a Presidential amnesty had commuted Mr. Mahrami’s death sentence to life imprisonment.

The government has also used the courts to reinforce a general sense of second-class citizenship for Bahá’ís. Over the years, there have been numerous discriminatory decisions rendered against Bahá’ís.

In a recent court case, for example, 12 plaintiffs filed a petition against a man accused of murdering their relative, who was a Bahá’í. The court’s verdict recognized the crime as a “quasi-intentional” murder and convicted the man as charged. But he was sentenced, without payment of blood money, to only four months imprisonment, and that was suspended as time already served. Calling Bahá’ís a “perverse sect” and “infidels,” the court concluded that they should receive neither requital nor blood money in cases of murder. This verdict is alarming, as it could incite Muslims to believe that they are free to take the lives of Bahá’ís in Iran with impunity.

Economic Measures

In the 1980s, over 10,000 Bahá’ís were dismissed from positions in government and educational institutions. Many remain unemployed and receive no unemployment benefits. The pensions of Bahá’ís dismissed on religious grounds were terminated, and some were even required to return salaries paid to them before they were dismissed.

Efforts to impoverish the Bahá’í community and to deprive its members of their economic livelihood have continued through a variety of means. In particular, government authorities have in many places around the country continued to block Bahá’ís from receiving pensions, conducting business, or finding employment. Authorities have also continued in the arbitrary confiscation of homes and properties owned by Bahá’ís.

Employment

Limitations on employment opportunities continue to be imposed on Bahá’ís in various sectors of the economy. Even when Bahá’ís find employment in the private sector, government officials often intervene and force the owners of the companies to fire them. And when Bahá’ís start a private business, the authorities attempt to block their activities.

Two recent court cases, for example, demonstrate the efforts of the authorities to impede Bahá’ís from conducting private business activities.

In September 2003, Branch 13 of the Tribunal of Administrative Justice rejected an appeal by a Bahá’í businessman against an injunction that required him to cease his business operations. The court also rejected his petition to obtain a business license. The tribunal held that his appeal was “disqualified as irrelevant, as [it was] outside the scope of the applicable regulations,” citing the information the court had “about the plaintiff’s being associated with the perverse Baha’i sect.”

In 2003, in a second, similar case, an administrative injunction was issued to impede a Bahá’í-owned company in Isfahan from doing business. The company is owned and directed by a Bahá’í engineer and employs some 120 staff — most of whom are Bahá’ís — manufacturing electrical and communication cables. In the injunction, the Director-General of the Central Office of Protection, which is under the Iranian Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, informed the company of an official memorandum issued in April 2003. The document concluded that “the link between the… company… and the perverse Baha’i sect is established to be true; therefore it is advisable to adopt measures to prevent any collaboration with the above-mentioned company.”

The intergovernmental body most concerned with the right to employment, the International Labour Organization (ILO), made a number of references to the ongoing discrimination against the Bahá’ís in Iran at its annual Conference on Conventions and Recommendations in June 2003. The “situation of members of the Bahá’í Faith, an unrecognized religious minority, continues to be a source of concern,” said the report. “The barriers that these people face in access to higher education and to employment in public institutions are still high.”

Deprivation of Pensions

In the first years of its campaign of persecution, the Iranian government stopped pension payments to thousands of Bahá’ís who had been employed in government service. Bahá’ís have, over the years, sought to have their pensions restored. The government, however, continues to deny many Bahá’ís rightfully earned pension funds. Documents prove that this policy is intentional — and solely related to the pensioner’s membership in the Bahá’í Faith.

In a letter dated 30 May 2003, for example, the Office of Beneficiary Affairs of the Keshavarzi Bank instructed its General Office to discontinue the disbursement of a Bahá’í’s pension to his heirs because he was a member of the Bahá’í “sect.” The decision was later confirmed by the head of the Office of Legal and Parliament Affairs, who cited a judicial decree of Imam Khomeini and said a letter of the National Retirement Bureau number 6/18448 (dated 3 November 2003) must be implemented in such cases.

Likewise, in a letter dated 17 December 2003, the General Office of Finance transmitted a letter to the director of the Retirement Bureau of the Province of Azerbaijan-e-Sharqi, stating that since a Bahá’í’s employment had been terminated due to his belief in “the perverse Baha’i sect,” there was no authorization to return or transfer his retirement deductions.

Earlier documented evidence involved decisions in four more cases, dating from July 2001 to November 2002, where Iranian Bahá’ís have been denied access to their own, rightfully earned pensions. The documents prove that this action was taken solely on the basis of religious belief, as they explicitly state: “payment of pension to those individuals connected with the Baha’i sect is illegal.”

The Confiscation of Property

During the past few years, there has been an increase in confiscation of Bahá’í properties, in particular in the cities of Rafsanjan, Kerman, Marv-Dasht, and Yazd. Property owned by Bahá’ís has also been confiscated in Tehran, in the village of Kata and in the village of Matneq. In October 2004, for example, the homes of six Bahá’í families in Kata (in the Buyir-Ahmad region of Iran) were confiscated on the order of the prosecutor of the city of Shiraz, with the assistance of the local police.

In virtually every case, court judgments or documents have emerged that prove the properties were confiscated because the owners were Bahá’ís.

For example, one house confiscated in Tehran in 1998 belonged to a Muslim landlord, who was leasing the property to a Bahá’í. The landlord lodged an appeal, and an extract from the court documents (dated 15 September 2001) reveals the underlying judicial issues:

“In principle, the foundation for the Ministry of Intelligence taking legal and serious action against the cultural activities of the misguided sect of Baha’ism has been on the order of His Excellency the Supreme Leader.… The action taken by Court 49 regarding the seizure and confiscation of the properties belonging to the misguided sect of Baha’ism is legally and religiously justifiable.… Such opposition [however] must be carried out in a manner and within a framework through which the rights of the righteous [literally, ‘those to whom rights are due’] would be safeguarded and protected.”

In yet another recent case, a Bahá’í appealed for the return of his home, confiscated because of its alleged use as a venue for teaching about the Bahá’í Faith, and for holding classes of the Bahá’í Institute for Higher Education. In rejecting the appeal, the Islamic Revolutionary Court upheld the decision of a lower court on the grounds that the owner had held Bahá’í classes in this home and that over 900 volumes of Bahá’í books had been found there. A further attempt to obtain redress was also denied, as Branch 23 of the Appeals Court in Tehran declared the verdict final and ended all legal recourse in this case.

Such verdicts demonstrate that the Iranian authorities continue to consider the Bahá’í Faith as an illegal movement and legitimize, through the courts, violations against the rights of Iranian citizens who are members of the Bahá’í community.